Kerberoast
Theory
When asking the KDC (Key Distribution Center) for a Service Ticket (ST), the requesting user needs to send a valid TGT (Ticket Granting Ticket) and the service name (sname
) of the service wanted. If the TGT is valid, and if the service exists, the KDC sends the ST to the requesting user.
Multiple formats are accepted for the sname
field: servicePrincipalName (SPN), sAMAccountName (SAN), userPrincipalName (UPN), etc. (see Kerberos tickets).
The ST is encrypted with the requested service account's NT hash. If an attacker has a valid TGT and knows a service (by its SAN or SPN), he can request a ST for this service and crack it offline later in an attempt to retrieve that service account's password.
In most situations, services accounts are machine accounts, which have very complex, long, and random passwords. But if a service account, with a human-defined password, has a SPN set, attackers can request a ST for this service and attempt to crack it offline. This is Kerberoasting.
Practical
Recon
User Enumeration
LDAP
Request ST
Impacket
For all users
For specific user
Crack Hash
John
Hashcat
Sync Local Time with the Server
Get Shell Access
REFERENCES
Last updated
Was this helpful?